Exposing and Eliminating Vulnerabilities to
Denial of Service Attacks in Secure Gossip-Based Multicast.
In IEEE Transactions on
Dependable and Secure Computing (TDSC), 3:1, March 2006.
International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
(DSN), June-July 2004.
We propose a framework and methodology for quantifying the effect of
denial of service (DoS) attacks on a distributed system. We present a
systematic study of the resistance of gossip-based multicast protocols
to DoS attacks. We show that even distributed and randomized
gossip-based protocols, which eliminate single points of failure, do
not necessarily eliminate vulnerabilities to DoS attacks. We propose
Drum -- a simple gossip-based multicast protocol that
eliminates such vulnerabilities. Drum was implemented in Java and
tested on a large cluster. We show, using closed-form mathematical
analysis, simulations, and empirical tests, that Drum survives severe
Preprint of DSN paper:
Preprint of IEEE TDSC paper:
Technical Report CCIT 477, Technion Department
of Electrical Engineering, June 2004:
Talk slides (powerpoint):